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This study examines and critiques rhetorical use of the term complicity by the Religious 
Right in six U.S. Supreme Court cases from 1973 to 2021 as a tactic to restrict access to 
reproductive care and exert control over female reproductive bodies. Comparing the language 
invoked by Religious Right claimants and the Supreme Court justices to my working definition 
of complicity reveals that use of complicity regarding reproductive care in the United States has 
expanded in scope over time. However, the argument fails to meet four essential criteria 
necessary for being considered complicit. Religious Right claimants generally base their 
complicity arguments on a “slippery slope” fallacy and object to their perceived financial 
facilitation of abortion and contraceptive medications through taxes and healthcare. The evidence 
demonstrates that by drawing legal boundaries around the definition of complicity, the Supreme 
Court would improve its ability to evaluate the legitimacy of religious-based complicity claims, 
protect reproductive care access for third-party people with uteruses, and strike a better balance 
between the increasingly conflicting rights to religious and reproductive freedom. 
 
 
Key Terms: complicity; abortion; contraceptives; morality; law and society; U.S. law; 
intersectionality; embodied subjectivity; Culture Wars; Religious Right; Contraceptive Mandate; 
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I. Introduction: Reproductive Care’s Tenuous Intersectional Position in U.S. Law 
In the 2020 U.S. presidential election, 68% of registered voters reported that healthcare is 
a “very important” issue to their presidential vote; 40% said the same of abortion (Important 
Issues in the 2020 Election, 2020.) Although abortion had the lowest ranking in the survey, it 
appeared alongside 10 other issues voters deemed “very important,” including the economy, 
Supreme Court appointments, the 2020 coronavirus outbreak, violent crime, foreign policy, gun 
policy, race and ethnic inequality, immigration, economic inequality, and climate change 
(Important Issues in the 2020 Election, 2020.) If “the personal is political,” to quote the second-
wave feminists of the 1960s and ‘70s, then reproductive care, and abortion specifically, is the 
quintessential example, with serious consequences. 
Reproductive health care’s tenuous position as both private and public makes it an issue 
fraught with misconceptions. For instance, abortion is far more common than people realize. 
According to a 2017 report by the Guttmacher Institute, nearly one in four women in the United 
States will have had an abortion by the time they are 45 years old, and at 34%, women aged 20- 
24 account for the largest number of abortions (Abortion is a Common Experience for U.S. 
Women, Despite Dramatic Declines in Rates, 2017). This means that we very likely have 
someone in our lives who has had an abortion; I personally know of at least two. I remember 
being surprised when, after a night of drinking, a close friend of mine confided to me that she 
had undergone an abortion three years before, during her freshman year of college, after an 
unintended pregnancy with her longtime boyfriend. She explained that she kept it a secret 
because she was worried that people might perceive her differently and shame her for her 
choices; that I, her friend of ten years, would castigate her. I remember telling her that I did not 
think any less of her, and that she should be proud of herself for making a decision that felt right 
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to her. Knowing what I know now, I wonder how many others there are in my life, people whom I 
love, who treat their abortions as skeletons in the dark, reluctant to let them out for fear of the 
social stigma. As a woman living in the United States, that person could very easily be me. 
Another misconception regarding reproductive care are the reasons why individuals take 
contraceptive medications. According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), from 2015- 
2017, 64.9% of women aged 15-49 in the U.S. were currently using a method of contraception 
(Daniels & Abma, 2018). In a 2011 report on the use of oral contraceptive pills, the Guttmacher 
Institute found that 86% of women use the pill for pregnancy prevention, but they also found that 
many women use the pill for non-contraceptive reasons (Many American Women Use Birth 
Control Pills for Noncontraceptive Reasons, 2011). They found that 31% of women use the pill 
for menstrual regulation; 28% of women used the pill for the “side effects” of menstruation (such 
as migraines and cramps); 14% of women use the pill to treat acne; and 4% of women use the 
pill to treat endometriosis. An individual person might use the pill for multiple reasons, but the 
study found that only 42% of women use the pill exclusively for pregnancy prevention. Other 
hormonal contraceptive methods such as the ring, patch, implant, and intrauterine device (IUD) 
offer similar benefits. From these statistics, it is clear that birth control is an essential form of 
healthcare for people with uteruses not only for sexual intimacy, but for their individual mental, 
emotional, and physical well-being. 
Because abortion and contraception occupy the intersection between private and public 
spheres, this also means they rest at the intersection of the constitutionally protected rights to 
religious exercise and reproductive freedom. The U.S. constitution’s simultaneous promises of 
separation between church and state and freedom to exercise religion, coupled with reproductive 
care’s intersectional position, has made abortion and contraceptives particularly susceptible to 
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legal and legislative attacks. The Hyde Amendment, passed in 1976, blocks federal funds from 
being used for abortions, with the exception being in cases of rape, incest, or a threat to the 
pregnant woman’s life. Under the facade of protecting women’s health, Targeted Restrictions of 
Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws impose medically unnecessary requirements on abortion 
facilities with the goal of shutting them down. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby in 2014, the Supreme 
Court gave for-profit corporations the right to religious exemption from the Affordable Care 
Act’s federally mandated abortion and contraceptive coverage because to comply would conflict 
with the company owner’s “sincerely held” religious beliefs and make them complicit in 
immoral conduct. In 2019, 25 abortion bans and 58 abortion restrictions were enacted, mostly in 
states in the South and Midwestern U.S. Restrictions ranged from gestational age bans, bans on 
specific abortion methods, bans on patient reasoning, to “trigger bans” in the event that Roe v. 
Wade is overturned (Access to Contraception, 2017). Through a combination of legislation and 
court rulings, the Religious Right has been largely successful in limiting abortion and 
contraceptive access to U.S. individuals with uteruses. 
Looking at the U.S.’s legal and legislative history, it is clear that as the private matter of 
reproductive care becomes increasingly public and subject to religious scrutiny, so too do 
women’s bodies become increasingly controlled by the state, thereby denying them full 
reproductive agency and autonomy. In 2017, nearly 49% of pregnancies were unintended, and 
were especially common among low-income women and women of color. Despite Roe v. Wade’s 
legalization of abortion in 1973, high out of pocket costs, deductibles, copayments, legislation 
like the Hyde Amendment, and legal rulings such as Hobby Lobby have prevented individuals 
with uteruses from fully exercising their right to reproductive freedom, particularly low-income 
women who are more likely to be uninsured. Even if contraception is covered, women still pay 
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approximately 60% of the out-of-pocket cost compared with the typical out-of-pocket cost of 
only 33% for non-contraceptive medications. Furthermore, at the same time that Catholics are 
one of the most vocal groups opposed to abortion and contraceptives, 10 out of 25 of the largest 
U.S. health systems are Catholic-sponsored facilities (Access to Contraception, 2017). Given 
both Hobby Lobby’s ruling and the tradition of legal precedence, there exists a strong potential 
for this ruling to expand and allow physicians, nurses, and even pharmacists to deny individuals 
reproductive care on religious grounds. Can you imagine the outrage if health insurance coverage 
of medications like Viagra were suddenly unavailable to individuals with penises due to the 
religious preferences of their employer or healthcare provider? Better yet, as I am writing in the 
moment of the COVID-19 pandemic, what if the religious convictions held by employers’ or 
healthcare providers denied individuals access to the COVID-19 vaccine, a vaccine that is 
essential for ending a public health emergency? 
 
II. Statement of the Problem: Religious Right and Legal Understandings of Complicity  
Much research has been conducted examining legislation and legal rulings as locations 
for the Religious Right to subvert the right to reproductive care that was established by Roe v. 
Wade in 1973. Extensive research has also been published arguing why Religious Right claims 
against abortion and contraceptives in the legal sphere are morally and scientifically incorrect, 
with a special focus on how these claims undermine reproductive care access and are harmful to 
people with uteruses. Indeed, as I have already illustrated, the effects of reproductive care 
restrictions are immense. However, while academic work has devoted significant effort to 
refuting Religious Right claims against abortion and contraceptives by focusing on the 
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implications, and rightfully so, little scholarly work has been devoted to understanding the logic 
of Religious Right claims against these activities, and why they have been successful in U.S law. 
Few scholars recognize that a central component to Religious Right claims against 
abortion and contraceptives in the courtroom is not a blatant disregard for people with uteruses’ 
reproductive agency and autonomy. Rather, it is the notion that their own actions (or inactions) 
have influence in reproductive care outcomes, and as such, their actions (or inactions) are also 
capable of making them complicit, or even potentially complicit, in conduct they believe to be 
morally abhorrent. Their initial, individual action might be innocent in and of itself, but can and 
does lead others to perform subsequent acts that end in the destruction of a fetus, an act that is 
inherently and immoral. It is under this framing that Religious Right legal claims against 
abortion and contraceptives have been institutionalized and continue to operate in the U.S. 
Many scholars have started to investigate the complicity claim, particularly as it pertains 
to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), in which the complicity claim was made very explicitly. 
Many seek to answer questions such as: What does complicity look like? How do we measure it? 
Is complicity based on our proximity to a specific action being taken? Is it based on our 
relationship to the individual taking that action? While few researchers strive to answer these 
questions, even fewer recognize that the complicity claim is not isolated to Hobby Lobby; in fact, 
the complicity claim is an identifiable trend in Religious Right legal arguments against abortion 
and contraceptives that has existed since Roe v. Wade (1973). While academic work has 
extensively examined the political and legal implications of Religious Right complicity logic, 
little work seeks to combat the complicity logic itself, whether it be amongst individuals or 
within U.S. legal institutions. Because of this neglect, research meant to encourage Religious 
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Right anti-choice advocates to join the pro-choice movement falls on deaf ears, sometimes even 
exacerbating the culture war divide. 
This project answers the questions: How have Religious Right anti-choice claimants’ 
rhetoric of complicity evolved and expanded under U.S. Supreme Court rulings since Roe v. 
Wade in 1973, and is their rhetorical use of complicity legitimate? To answer this question, this 
study analyzes rhetorical trends in six U.S. Supreme Court cases from 1973 to 2020 in which 
Religious Right claimants use the complicity argument as a legal tactic to restrict abortion and 
contraceptive access. By applying feminist theories of state control of the body and 
intersectionality with multi-disciplinary legal and philosophical interpretations, I use my own 
working definition of complicity to argue that Religious Right complicity claims regarding 
reproductive care have expanded in ways that are not only harmful to people with uteruses, but 
also that are flawed and illegitimate. This case study lays the groundwork for how legal 
boundaries around the definition of complicity might be constructed as a potential solution for 
the Supreme Court to better assess Religious Right complicity claims and balance religious and 
reproductive freedoms without one undermining the other. 
 
III. Literature Review: Legal Philosophies 
It is clear that as American society has evolved, so, too, has American citizens’ 
relationship with the law. In her book Invitation to Law and Society: An Introduction to the Study 
of Real Law, scholar Kitty Calavita discusses the varying ways in which the law shapes society. 
She reveals that whether individuals realize it or not, the law shapes the way individuals live by 
creating conceptual boundaries and determining the content of those boundaries (Calavita, 2010). 
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s critical race theory and theory of intersectionality are introduced to 
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demonstrate not only how social categories like race and gender are socially constructed, but also 
how these categories are often disempowered by the law because they tend to be viewed as 
mutually exclusive (Calavita, 2010). The law is not as fair, neutral, or just as it may outwardly 
appear. American law contains gaps that lead to non-enforcement, selective enforcement, and 
different interpretations of the statutes, and as a result the law in practice impacts individuals 
differently based on their social positionality (Calavita, 2010). 
One of the most significant ways that American society’s relationship with the law has 
changed is due to the power of Christian religion on legislation. Despite the American 
Constitution’s provision of the separation between church and state, Christian religion has 
become increasingly present, and even dominant, in the law, which has a particularly harmful 
and discriminatory impact on non-Christians, women, and the LGBTQ+ community. In A Brief, 
Liberal, Catholic Defense of Abortion, Dombrowski and Deltete (2000) outline the roots of many 
religious claimants’ opposition to abortion and “abortifacients,” which includes the aspect of 
natural law that sex should only occur in monogamous marriage for a solely procreative purpose, 
as well as the perception of a fetus as a potential human person, and that having a human body 
provides enough evidence of a fetus having a human soul (Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000). Other 
Religious Right anti-choice claims are based on the belief that life begins at the moment of 
conception, or that contraceptives prevent the fertilization of an ovum that would otherwise 
become human life (Corrado Del Bo, 2012, pp. 133-145). 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision to protect women’s right to privacy in the 1973 case 
Roe v. Wade, the Religious Right has used popular culture, state legislatures, Congress, and the 
courts to exert influence and effectively undermine sexuality policy (Joffe, 2007). Using the 
rhetoric of war, emergency, or catastrophe, the Religious Right has started a “Culture War'' 
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between the constitutionally protected rights to freedom of religion and freedom to reproductive 
care (Ben-Asher, 2018). By encouraging the passage of parental-consent laws, TRAP laws, and 
cultural stigmatization of abortion, Religious Right efforts have been largely successful (Joffe, 
2007). The courts especially have been a major location of triumph for the Religious Right 
against abortion rights, as cases like Harris v. McRae (1980), Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services (1983), Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), and 
Gonzalez v. Carhart (2003) have upheld abortion restrictions such as preventing their federal 
funding and banning “partial birth abortions” (Joffe, 2007, p. 72). 
Most recently, the Supreme Court case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby in 2014 marks a 
revolutionary strengthening of the historical trends of Religious Right claims against 
reproductive rights. Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), employers are required to uphold the 
“Contraceptive Mandate” and provide employees with insurance coverage for abortion and 
contraceptive healthcare. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the law on which the 
Hobby Lobby decision was based, was enacted in 1993 to protect the first amendment rights of 
religious minorities in the aftermath of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources 
of Oregon v. Smith (1990), and it was enabled under the ACA in 2010 to allow non-profit 
employers to exempt themselves from the Contraceptive Mandate on religious grounds (Ben- 
Asher, 2018). Although accommodations have historically existed in private spaces in the U.S., 
until recently, religious exemptions were largely uncommon, and Hobby Lobby became the first 
case in which a public, commercial entity could do so (Sepper, 2016, p. 652). In the Hobby 
Lobby case, the Supreme Court decided that the RFRA applied to not only non-profit 
organizations, but for-profit companies as well because they are a collective of individuals with 
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their own moral and religious beliefs who should not have to be complicit in an act that they find 
morally objectionable. 
In essence, the Supreme Court gave the Hobby Lobby corporation permission to 
discriminate against thousands of its employees, regardless of their religious beliefs, who may 
become pregnant from receiving abortion and contraceptive coverage. This third-party harm was 
left largely unconsidered by the Court (Sepinwall, 2015). In a legal system that follows legal 
precedent, the doctrine of “corporate conscience” has dangerous implications for people with 
uteruses as more individuals have sought religious exemptions from providing abortion and 
contraceptive care, including pharmacists, doctors, and other healthcare workers (Sepper, 2015). 
These implications extend beyond abortion and contraceptives toward medical procedures such 
as end-of-life care. In her dissent in Hobby Lobby (2014), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined 
by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, explains that women’s participation in the economic sphere depends 
on their ability to control their reproductive lives. Furthermore, women pay much more than men 
for preventative care, and cost is capable of blocking women from receiving any preventative 
care at all. As such, providing religious exemptions would deny coverage to women who do not 
share their employer’s religious beliefs. In her conclusion, she quotes an opinion made by the 
Lee Court, “‘When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of 
choice . . . the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not 
to be superimposed on statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity’” (Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014, sec. IV). 
The increasing scope of how religious claimants define complicity begs the question, how 
has their philosophical definition of complicity in abortion and contraceptive services evolved 
and expanded under U.S. Supreme Court rulings since Roe v. Wade in 1973? Where is the 
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boundary between complicity and responsibility? Should the Court draw legal boundaries around 
the definition of complicity, and if so, how should it be measured? According to Nejaime and 
Siegel (2015), there are two dimensions to complicity-based conscience claims; the third party’s 
conduct, and the claimant’s relationship to the third party (p. 2518). Sepinwall (2015) goes even 
further, and argues that complicity can be determined based on moral claims, empirical claims, 
and relational claims (p. 1912). She points out that complicity is not as simple as a claimant’s 
proximity to the act in question, because often the claimant has no choice in what actions the 
third party does or does not take, and measuring by proximity denies moral responsibility for 
actions one does not directly participate in (Sepinwall, 2015). Furthermore, it is clear that in 
contrast to the law, religious claimants believe that a “relatively weak” relationship to the act in 
question is enough to implicate them (Sepinwall, 2015, p. 1935). At the same time, courts must 
weigh religious claims against government and third-party interests, and there must be empirical 
standards for courts to determine their validity (Sepinwall, 2015, p. 1929, 1933). 
This study adds to the body of research done on Religious Right anti-choice complicity 
claims by comparing the language invoked by Religious Right claimants and Supreme Court 
justices with qualitative analysis of how these claimants perceive their complicity to the 
abortion/contraceptive act they are objecting to. It examines how the increasing scope of 
complicity affects people with uteruses’ access to abortion and contraceptive services, how direct 
the lines of complicity are, and whether legal boundaries must be established around 
complicity’s definition in order to ensure more fair and consistent legal decision-making. This 
study argues that Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims are invalid and harmful to people 
with uteruses, and as such, boundaries around complicity are necessary for the Court to better 
assess their legitimacy. By developing my own working definition of complicity, this study 
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demonstrates why Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims are invalid, how they negatively 
impact people with uteruses, and that definitional boundaries around complicity are a potential 
solution for the U.S. legal system to strike a better balance between protecting religious and 
reproductive freedoms. 
 
IV. Research Design: Defining “Complicit” 
My research study follows an interpretive case research design in order to conduct a 
qualitative study of how Religious Right anti-choice claimants understand complicity regarding 
reproductive care, how they employ complicity rhetoric in the U.S. Supreme Court setting as a 
tactic to restrict reproductive care, and why their complicity rhetoric fails. To study this, my unit 
of analysis comes from six U.S. Supreme Court cases specifically dealing with abortion, 
contraceptives, and questions of complicity between 1973 (when Roe v. Wade was decided) and 
the present (2021). To select the cases for analysis, I started with the cases that appeared most 
frequently in academic work on this topic, then narrowed it down to the cases whose legal issue 
in question best fit my definition of complicity. For the purposes of this research, my definition 
of complicity draws from the Oxford English Dictionary, Black’s Law Dictionary, U.S. criminal 
law, and previous scholarship to provide a more philosophically and legally comprehensive 
definition. The definitions of complicity from these sources are as follows: According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, complicity is “The being an accomplice; partnership in an evil 
action” (Complicity, n.). Black’s Law Dictionary (Garner, 2019) is more precise. In Black’s, 
“complicity” means “1) Involvement in a crime together with other people; association or 
participation in a criminal act as an accomplice. Under the Model Penal Code, a person can be an 
accomplice as a result of either that person’s own conduct or the conduct of another (such as an 
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innocent agent) for which that person is legally accountable” or “2) Involvement in or knowledge 
of a situation that is morally wrong or entails dishonesty.” According to U.S. criminal law, such 
as that of the Washington State Legislature: 
1) A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another person for 
which he or she is legally accountable. 
2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: 
a) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the 
crime, he or she causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such 
conduct; or 
b) He or she is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this title or 
by the law defining the crime; or 
c) He or she is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the crime. 
3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: 
a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he 
or she: 
i) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or 
ii) Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or 
b) His or her conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his or her complicity. 
4) A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular crime himself or herself 
may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he 
or she is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of 
the provision establishing his or her incapacity. 
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5) Unless otherwise provided by this title or by the law defining the crime, a person is not 
an accomplice in a crime committed by another person if: 
a) He or she is a victim of that crime; or 
b) He or she terminates his or her complicity prior to the commission of the crime, 
and either gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise 
makes a good faith effort to prevent the commission of the crime. 
6) A person legally accountable for the conduct of another person may be convicted on 
proof of the commission of the crime and of his or her complicity therein, though the 
person claimed to have committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted or 
has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime or has an immunity to 
prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted (Liability for Conduct of Another—
Complicity.) 
The verbiage of these definitions of complicity make it clear that it is very active concept, 
not passive, using verbs like promote, facilitate, solicit, command, encourage, and request. 
Complicity also has an inherently negative connotation, as these definitions contain language like 
crime, dishonesty, culpability, accomplice, and wrong. Additionally, these definitions 
demonstrate that complicity has a close relationship to responsibility, which the Oxford English 
Dictionary defines as “The state or fact of being accountable; liability, accountability for 
something” (Complicity, n.). As such, how do we differentiate between when we are responsible 
and when we are complicit? 
From these sources and their definitions of complicity, I developed my own working 
definition in an attempt to capture complicity’s simultaneous legal specificity and moral 
ambiguity. For the purposes of this research project, while responsibility describes an individual 
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as being the primary if not the only agent in an act of wrongdoing, complicity describes degrees 
of agency one has in an act of wrongdoing, and specifically an act of wrongdoing done by 
another person. The more agency one has in the act, the more complicit they are. One is not 
complicit legally if they are a victim of the evil act, if one ends their involvement before the evil 
act is committed, or if one has no way of knowing/reasonable suspicion that another person is 
performing an evil act. The act can be positive or negative, done intentionally or unintentionally, 
and with awareness or unawareness of the consequences. Complicity and responsibility both 
mean being accountable for others’ well-being, but they also mean being accountable for others’ 
suffering. One can also be collectively responsible and/or collectively complicit with others for 
something. For instance, no one is singularly responsible for climate change, but individuals are 
collectively complicit in climate change because everyone emits varying amounts of greenhouse 
gases. These individuals are collectively responsible for each others’ health and the well-being of 
the planet. Individuals do not necessarily have agency over each others’ carbon emissions (and 
therefore cannot be responsible for them), but they do have agency over their own carbon 
emissions, and therefore a responsibility to lower them for the collective good. 
Based on this definition of complicity, I selected six U.S. Supreme Court cases, which 
includes Beal v. Doe (1977), Harris v. McRae (1980), Williams v. Zbaraz (1980), Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), and 
Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania (2020). 
I use these six cases to examine how Religious Right anti-choice claimants’ understand 
their own complicity in abortion and contraceptive care and how the scope of their self-assumed 
complicity has broadened under Supreme Court rulings from 1973 to the present. Through this 
Rahn, “Funding Abortion as Facilitating It” 




analysis, I assert that their claims to complicity are not only harmful to people with uteruses’ 
right to reproductive choice, but also that these complicity claims are flawed and illegitimate. 
Beal v. Doe is a 1977 case in which anti-choice advocates sought to uphold a 
Pennsylvania law that prevented Medicaid funds from going toward nontherapeutic abortions 
except for in situations where an abortion was medically necessary (Beal v. Doe, 1977). 
Examining Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Pennsylvania law and ruled that “nothing in the statute suggests that participating States are 
required to fund every medical procedure that falls within the delineated categories of medical 
care” (Beal v. Doe, 1977). Thus began the first of a chain of cases in which the Court ruled that 
while people with uteruses have reproductive rights, the state is not required to provide finances 
that allow them to exercise those rights. 
Harris v. McRae is a 1980 case in which appellees from New York contested that similar 
to the Pennsylvania law in Beal v. Doe (1977), the Hyde Amendment that was enacted in 1976 
was unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment (Harris v. McRae, 1980). The 
appellees claimed that that the state has a duty under Title XIX to provide Medicaid funding for 
abortions, a duty that the Hyde Amendment does not relieve. The central question in this case 
was, does “Title XIX require a State that participates in the Medicaid program to fund the cost of 
medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde 
Amendment” (Harris v. McRae, 1980)? In its analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that Roe v. 
Wade “did not translate into a constitutional obligation of [the state] to subsidize abortion,” and 
the Hyde Amendment “does not permit federal reimbursement of all medically necessary 
abortions” (Harris v. McRae, 1980). The Court also declared that the Hyde Amendment does not 
Rahn, “Funding Abortion as Facilitating It” 




violate the separation of church and state because it serves a secular legislative purpose” (Harris 
v. McRae, 1980). The Court asserted that “the Hyde Amendment, by encouraging childbirth 
except in the most urgent circumstances, is rationally related to the legitimate governmental 
objective of protecting potential life” (Harris v. McRae, 1980). As such, the Hyde Amendment is 
constitutional, and like Beal v. Doe, although individuals with uteruses have a right to an 
abortion, the state is not obligated to pay for them. 
Williams v. Zbaraz is another 1980 case related to Harris v. McRae (1980) (Williams v. 
Zbaraz, 1980). This case concerned an Illinois statute that prohibited government financial 
assistance toward abortion procedures except in cases where the abortion is necessary to save the 
woman’s life. The District Court ruled that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of 
federal funds for abortions, does not relieve the state of its responsibility under Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act to fund medically necessary abortions regardless of the threat to the woman’s 
life. The District Court ruled that the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the District Court lacked jurisdiction 
to judge the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. The central issue in this case, then, was if 
the District Court had the authority to consider the Hyde Amendment, and if the Hyde 
Amendment allows a state to restrict funding of abortions that it is obligated to fund by Title 
XIX. Here, the Supreme Court ruled that although the District Court claimed that the same 
analysis for the Illinois statute would apply to the Hyde Amendment and make both 
unconstitutional, it should not have considered the Hyde Amendment because it was outside of 
its jurisdiction. At the same time, using Harris v. McRae (1980) as precedent, the Supreme Court 
proclaimed that a state is not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions, and a statute like 
Illinois’s or the Hyde Amendment does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth 
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Amendment. By extension, then, the Hyde Amendment also does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is constitutional. Based on this reasoning, 
the Hyde Amendment has remained constitutional to this day. 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey is a 1992 case regarding the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, which required a woman seeking an abortion to 
give informed consent, a 24-hour waiting period between consent and the abortion procedure, as 
well as sign a statement claiming that she has informed her husband, or a parent if the seeker is a 
minor (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 1992). These requirements 
were exempted in the case of an emergency. The law also contained reporting requirements for 
facilities that provide abortions. The petitioners in this case were five abortion facilities, an 
individual physician, and a class of physicians who charge that all of the provisions of the act 
were unconstitutional and would overturn Roe v. Wade (1973). In the Supreme Court’s analysis, 
the justices made sweeping claims about who is involved in abortion decisions. The Court 
concluded the case by replacing the trimester framework established by Roe v. Wade (1973), 
which outlined at which stages of pregnancy abortions were legal, with the undue burden 
standard for whether or not a law was an impediment to an individual’s ability to exercise their 
reproductive rights. In regard to the Pennsylvania law, the Court ruled that the informed consent 
requirement, the 24-hour waiting period, and the spousal notification requirement, or parental 
notification if the abortion-seeker was a minor, imposed no undue burden on women’s ability to 
access an abortion. As such, the Pennsylvania statute was constitutional, and it opened the door 
for who has a say in people with uteruses’ reproductive decisions. 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the 2014 case that has already been mentioned several times in 
this project, concerned the Green family who own and operate Hobby Lobby stores nation-wide 
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according to their Christian faith, including their belief that contraceptives are immoral (Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014). One of the sons in the Green family also runs an affiliated 
Christian bookstore company called Mardel. The Green family’s case was joined with a case 
brought by the Hahn family, who run a for-profit business called Conestoga and are members of 
the Mennonite Church, a Christian denomination, and run their business according to their 
religious principles, which includes that life begins at conception. Both families of all three 
companies believe that facilitating access to contraceptive drugs and devices violates their 
religion. In September 2012, the Green family sued Kathleen Sebelius of the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services to contest the requirement that their healthcare plans 
for employees cover contraceptives as federally mandated by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). Looking at the RFRA, which prohibits the government from 
“substantially burdening” a person’s religious exercise unless it is for a “compelling 
governmental interest” and is done in the “least restrictive means,” the central question was 
whether or not RFRA, which traditionally only applied to non-profit companies, could apply to 
for-profit companies. In its analysis, the Supreme Court turned to the Dictionary Act, which 
states that the word person includes “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, 
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals” (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 2014). The Supreme Court ruled that since for-profit companies are made up of individuals 
with their own “sincerely held” religious beliefs and the contraceptive mandate only serves a 
broad government interest of “public health” and “gender equality” rather than a “compelling” 
interest, the contraceptive mandate violates the RFRA (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
2014). The Court then declared that the RFRA does apply to for-profit companies, meaning for- 
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profit companies can be exempted from the Contraceptive Mandate and deny contraceptive 
healthcare coverage to their employees on religious grounds. 
Finally, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania is the most recent case, brought to the 
Supreme Court in 2020 by Little Sisters of the Poor, a Roman Catholic organization that runs 
religious nonprofits (Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 
2020). Similar to Hobby Lobby, Little Sisters of the Poor claimed that complying with the 
Contraceptive Mandate of the ACA and completing the self-certification form of the RFRA 
would “force them to violate their religious beliefs by ‘tak[ing] actions that directly cause others 
to provide contraception or appear to participate in the Departments’ delivery scheme” (Little 
Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 2020). The organization was 
opposed to four specific methods of contraception covered by the Contraceptive Mandate that 
they believed “risked causing the death of a human embryo,” and if they were to provide them, 
they would be made complicit in abortion (Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home 
v. Pennsylvania, 2020). In this case, the central issue was if the federal government had lawfully 
allowed for religious objectors to be exempted from the contraceptive mandate of the ACA. 
Again turning to the RFRA, the Supreme Court majority opinion ruled that because the language 
of the RFRA never mentions contraceptives, Congress failed to protect contraceptive coverage. 
This means that the Contraceptive Mandate is capable of violating the RFRA, and the 
Departments had the authority to exempt Little Sisters of the Poor from the Contraceptive 
Mandate. 
To summarize these cases, Beal v. Doe (1977), Harris v. McRae (1980) and Williams v. 
Zbaraz (1980) are a chain of three cases in which the Supreme Court ruled that while people 
with uteruses have reproductive rights, as ruled in Roe v. Wade (1973), neither the state nor the 
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federal government are obligated to pay for them. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), the Court ruled that a 1982 Pennsylvania abortion law was 
constitutional because they claimed it posed no undue burden on abortion access, and it widened 
the scope of who has a say in people with uteruses’ reproductive decisions. Finally, Burwell v 
Hobby Lobby (2014) and Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania (2020) are two cases in which 
the Court declared that religious objectors have a right to be exempted from the Contraceptive 
Mandate based on the employers’ religious beliefs, regardless of whether they are a for-profit 
company or a nonprofit organization. 
The language in these cases fit my definition of complicity by evoking closely related 
terms such as obligation, immoral, sinful, violate, implicate, facilitate, consequence, authority, 
participate, permission, “sincere belief,” and the term complicit itself, all of which suggest a 
negative perception of abortion and contraceptives and the existence of an influential relationship 
between the religious petitioner and the respondent. This is an ideal sample because not only are 
these six cases accessibly located in the public domain, but because of federal supremacy, the 
interpretations of complicity made by the Supreme Court and religious claimants are highly 
generalizable to the U.S. population and U.S. law at the local, state, and federal levels. 
Additionally, because the cases are spread across the 47-year period between 1973 and the 
present, and because of the U.S. tradition of legal precedence, they adequately represent the 
long-lasting legal changes in the understanding of complicity by religious claimants and U.S. 
judges over time. This sample is also valid and reliable, as extensive research has been 
conducted on the relationship between religion and reproductive rights using these same cases and 
arriving at the conclusion that religion tends to undermine reproductive rights. That being said, 
this research is somewhat limited because only six cases out of the 46 abortion and contraceptive 
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cases available in the public domain, but the principle of legal precedence accommodates for this 
limitation as each case draws on the rules established by those before that dealt with similar legal 
questions. 
By analyzing the language used by Religious Right anti-choice complicity claimants in 
the Supreme Court setting, my research adopts the interpretive method to develop a theory about 
how Religious Right anti-choice claimants’ define and perceive their own complicity, and how 
their perception of complicity has expanded under legal rulings over time. In doing so, I dissect 
these Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims to demonstrate the fallacies on which they 
rest and the negative consequences they have on people with uteruses. 
 
V. Findings 
Complicity as Financial Facilitation 
All of the cases dealing with complicity raise questions regarding state and federal 
programs and employer responsibilities. Within this context, it is no surprise that in one way or 
another, all of the cases convey the perception of complicity in abortion and contraceptive 
services as being mainly centered around some sort of financial facilitation. Beginning with Beal 
v. Doe (1977), in which the central question is if “Title XIX requires Pennsylvania to fund under 
its Medicaid program the cost of all abortions that are permissible under state law,” the question 
itself suggests that state funding for abortions might make the state complicit in an act it finds 
morally reprehensible (Beal v. Doe, 1977). In this case, the Supreme Court consistently repeated 
that the state has an “important and legitimate interest” in protecting human life, and as such, 
“nothing  in the [Title XIX] suggests that participating States are required to fund every medical 
procedure that falls within the delineated categories of medical care” (Beal v. Doe, 1977). The 
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Court concluded that a state may provide funds for abortions if it so chooses, but it is not 
required to. This not only suggests that abortions are an immoral act, but it also gives the state 
the ability to make its own conscientious decisions regarding what is moral or immoral, and 
whether or not to make itself complicit in certain acts by means of financial facilitation.  
Harris v. McRae (1980) and Williams v. Zbaraz (1980) take the implication of state 
complicity from Beal v. Doe (1977) one step further, and suggest that through federal funding of 
abortion and contraceptive services, taxpayers may even be considered complicit. In the 
Supreme Court case Harris v. McRae (1980), the central issue was if “Title XIX require[s] a 
State that participates in the Medicaid program to fund the cost of medically necessary abortions 
for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde Amendment” (Harris v. McRae, 
1980) Similarly, in Williams v. Zbaraz (1980), the Court considered the question if “the District 
Court ha[d] the authority to consider the Hyde Amendment, and does the Hyde Amendment 
allow a state to restrict funding of abortions that it is obligated to fund by Title XIX” (Williams v. 
Zbaraz, 1980)? 
The Hyde Amendment is a U.S. policy still in place today that was enacted in 1976 to 
“[p]rohibi[t] the use of federal funds for any health benefits coverage that includes abortion,” 
except in cases of rape, incest, or if the pregnancy threatens the life of the woman (pregnant 
person) (Casey, 2013). Any healthcare plans receiving federal funds must keep those funds 
separate from funds for abortion services (Casey, 2013). The law itself implies that not only 
might the state be complicit if it appoints funding toward abortions, but that the taxpayers who 
supply the finances for that funding would also be complicit. 
In Harris v. McRae (1980), the appellees claimed that “the effect of the Hyde 
Amendment is to withhold federal reimbursement for certain medically necessary abortions, but 
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not to relieve a participating State of its duty under Title XIX to provide for such abortions in its 
Medicaid plan” (Harris v. McRae, 1980). This demonstrates a fundamental difference in how 
abortion is perceived. Whereas the appellees viewed abortion as a “duty” and “responsibility” for 
the state to provide, the state of Pennsylvania viewed it as an “evil” act in which providing 
Medicaid funding would make it complicit. As such, the Court ruled that because 
the Congress that enacted Title XIX did not intend a participating State to assume a 
unilateral funding obligation for any health service in an approved Medicaid plan, it 
follows that Title XIX does not require a participating State to include in its plan any 
services for which a subsequent Congress has withheld federal funding (Harris v. McRae, 
1980). 
Instead, as the Court claimed, the Hyde Amendment “places no governmental obstacle in the 
path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal 
subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in 
the public interest” (Harris v. McRae, 1980). Thus, “by encouraging childbirth except in the 
most urgent circumstances, [the Hyde Amendment] is rationally related to the legitimate 
governmental objective of protecting potential life” (Harris v. McRae, 1980). This reasoning was 
used as precedent to reach the same conclusion in Williams v. Zbaraz (1980). The rulings of both 
of these cases demonstrate that “encouraging childbirth” is the preferential, moral alternative to 
abortion, and that to direct federal funding toward such an “evil” act would make both the state 
and its lawful, taxpaying citizens complicit in immorality. By preventing federal funding from 
going toward abortion and specific contraceptive services, the state and taxpayers can prevent an 
evil act from occurring and avoid assuming guilt if it does. 
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Complicity as Financial Facilitation: Healthcare 
If Beal v. Doe (1977), Harris v. McRae (1980), and Williams v. Zbaraz (1980) 
established that financial facilitation is grounds for complicity, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) 
and Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) expanded that rhetoric to include healthcare coverage as a 
form of financial facilitation. In Hobby Lobby (2014), the Hahn family who own Conestoga 
Wood Specialties argued that because they believe that life begins at conception, it is “‘against 
[their] moral conviction to be involved in the termination of human life’ after conception, which 
they believe is a ‘sin against God to which they are held accountable’” (Hobby Lobby, 2014). 
Due to this assumption of complicity, the Hahns “accordingly excluded from the group-health- 
insurance plan they offer to their employees certain contraceptive methods that they consider to 
be abortifacients” (Hobby Lobby, 2014). This notion of complicity as financial facilitation 
through healthcare becomes even more explicit throughout the case, as the Hahns claimed that 
“‘it is immoral and sinful for [them] to intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or 
otherwise support these drugs’” (Hobby Lobby, 2014). Similarly, the Green family who own 
Hobby Lobby also believed “that life begins at conception and that it would violate their religion 
to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after that point” (Hobby Lobby, 
2014). 
Hobby Lobby’s (2014) understanding of healthcare coverage as facilitation of abortions 
and therefore complicity in them was used as precedent in Little Sisters of the Poor (2020), in 
which the religious organization claimed complicity on two grounds, with the first being “to the 
requirement that they maintain and pay for a plan under which coverage for contraceptives 
would be provided,” and the second being “to submission of the self-certification form required 
by the accommodation because without that certification their plan could not be used to provide 
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contraceptive coverage” Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 
2020). For the Hahns, the Greens, and Little Sisters of the Poor, their opposition to the 
Contraceptive Mandate suggests their belief that to comply would not only be permitting and 
making it possible for abortions to occur (specifically among their employees), but that they are 
actively causing those abortions be performed. Without healthcare coverage of abortions and 
“abortifacients,” the “termination of human life” cannot take place. While Beal v. Doe (1977), 
Harris v. McRae (1980), and Williams v. Zbaraz (1980) planted the seeds for what complicity 
could look like, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) and Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) broadened 
the term and made it explicit. 
The Supreme Court rulings in Beal v. Doe (1977), Harris v. McRae (1980), Williams v. 
Zbaraz (1980), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), and Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania 
(2020) suggest the existence of a relationship between money and property as a basis for 
complicity. According to the classical liberal thinker John Locke, whose philosophy 
predominates U.S. political thought, what we put our labor into becomes our property (Locke, 
2003, p. 191). What these five cases imply is that if the federal government, states, or taxpayers 
put their labor or money into the abortion and contraceptive services, whether it be direct funding 
or healthcare coverage, their financial property is permitting and in fact being used for an act 
they perceive as immoral. By extension, then, the “immoral” act of abortion and contraceptive 
services is their property, an act in which they must assume responsibility and they are complicit 
in because it is their money. Although money leaves their hands, and although they do not know 
whether or not those funds toward abortions are being used, because the money originated in 
their property, the resultant immoral act that is performed, or that could potentially be performed, 
is also their property. If funding is the means to an end, whether it be directly through federal 
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subsidizing or indirectly through healthcare, then to deny that funding avoids an assumption of 
guilt for an undesirable end. The Supreme Court rulings in Beal v. Doe (1977), Harris v. McRae 
(1980), Williams v. Zbaraz (1980), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), and Little Sisters of the Poor 
v. Pennsylvania (2020) demonstrate not only the institutionalization of the Religious Right belief 
that abortion and “abortifacients” are immoral, but also that the state and its taxpaying citizens 
are capable of being complicit in such an “immoral” act, an assumption of guilt that policies like 
the Hyde Amendment and the RFRA are designed to prevent. 
 
Complicity as a Snowball Effect, or the Slippery Slope Fallacy 
Finally, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby (2014), Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) illustrate the expansion made by previous 
cases of what kind of financial facilitation constitutes complicity in abortion and 
“abortifacients,” as well as a snowball effect logic for who is capable of being complicit through 
such financial facilitation and how. 
The first component of a snowball effect logic of Religious Right complicity claims 
concerns who is considered involved in the execution of an abortion or “abortifacient.” The 
majority opinion in Casey (1992) makes this particularly clear in stating: 
Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman 
who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist 
in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge 
that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence 
against innocent human life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for the life or potential life 
that is aborted (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1992). 
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What this statement suggests is a snowball effect of both who is involved with the abortion 
decision, as well as who is affected by it. Meanwhile, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), the 
Court acknowledged the snowball effect, but chose not to address it in full. Instead, the Court 
wrote: 
The Hahns and Greens believe that providing the coverage demanded by the HHS 
regulations is connected to the destruction of an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make 
it immoral for them to provide the coverage. This belief implicates a difficult and important 
question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is 
wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of 
enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.[34] Arrogating the 
authority to provide a binding national answer to this religious and philosophical question, 
HHS and the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed. For 
good reason, we have repeatedly refused to take such a step (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 
2014). 
Likewise, in Little Sisters of the Poor (2020), Justice Alito’s concurrence directly addresses the 
snowball effect problem of where to draw the line of complicity, then chooses to not answer it. 
Instead he says: 
Where to draw the line in a chain of causation that leads to objectionable conduct is a 
difficult moral question, and our cases have made it clear that courts cannot override the 
sincere religious beliefs of an objecting party on that question (Little Sisters of the Poor 
Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 2020). 
What these three cases indicate is an enlargement of the circle of people involved in ending the 
life or potential life of a fetus. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), 
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) broaden Religious Right rhetoric 
of complicity not just in terms of who is capable of facilitating an abortion procedure or 
“abortifacient” itself, but also who is capable of experiencing its presumed repercussions. 
The second component of the snowball effect logic of Religious Right complicity claims 
concerns how one becomes complicit, meaning, how their initial, individual action leads to a chain 
of subsequent events that end with an “immoral” abortion procedure or “abortifacient” use. 
However, in the case of Religious Right petitioners, there are little to no subsequent actions 
between their financial facilitation and the termination of a fetus. Instead, their financial facilitation 
is perceived as direct and active. Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) best exemplifies this snowball 
logic, as the organization believed that “completing the certification form would force them to 
violate their religious beliefs by ‘tak[ing] actions that directly [my emphasis] cause others to 
provide contraception or appear to participate in the Departments’ delivery scheme’” (Little Sisters 
of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 2020). To this claim the Court conceded, 
proclaiming that: 
If an employer has a religious objection to the use of a covered contraceptive, and if the 
employer has a sincere religious belief that compliance with the mandate makes it complicit 
in that conduct, then RFRA requires that the belief be honored (Little Sisters of the Poor 
Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 2020). 
Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) demonstrates the Religious Right’s assumption that providing 
funds, whether through federal subsidies or employee health care plans, will directly lead to others 
to having abortions or using “abortifacients;” there are no steps in between, nor are there alternative 
endings to the chain of events. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) demonstrate Religious Right’s 
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use of the term complicity to designate a slippery slope in a chain of actions that starts with their 
financial facilitation, and culminates with the perceived immoral behavior of terminating a fetus. 
 
VI. Discussion: Why Religious Right Rhetorical Use of Complicity Fails 
The Religious Right’s rhetorical use of the term complicity in abortion and contraceptive 
care has been effective in the courtroom, but not without some inherent flaws. Based on my 
working definition of complicity, Religious Right complicity claims fail on four grounds: on the 
“evil” criterion; on the agency criterion; on the involvement criterion; and on the “reasonable 
suspicion” criterion. The following section argues how Religious Right complicity claims fail on 
each of these criteria respectively. 
 
On the “Evil” Criterion 
Drawing on the work of Dombrowski and Deltete (2000), I wish to problematize the first 
criterion for complicity in Religious Right claims against abortion and contraceptives, which is 
on the “evil” criterion. First, at least up until the second trimester, even if a fetus has a human 
form, this is insufficient evidence to qualify it as a human person. Second, a fetus also has no 
identity or claim to rights. Third, for these reasons, neither the fetus nor Religious Right 
petitioners can claim victimhood from the act of abortion and contraceptive use. Finally, it is on 
this philosophical and scientific understanding with which the reason of legality, and therefore 
not “criminality,” of abortion and contraceptives operates. 
The Religious Right views abortion and “abortifacients” as “evil,” and by extension 
“criminal,” despite the Supreme Court having legalized their use through the right to privacy in 
cases like Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and, in a larger scope, Roe v. Wade (1973). As 
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previously stated, although the law might reflect the dominant culture’s acceptance of abortion 
and contraceptives, the morality of an act cannot rest solely on its legality. However, Religious 
Right claims to abortion and contraceptives as being “evil” does not fail only because these acts 
are legal in the U.S, but also because they rest on a scientifically and philosophically incorrect 
assumption of both when human life begins and what constitutes potential human life. 
According to Catholic scholars Deltete and Dombrowski, there are several reasons for 
why abortion is not murder and therefore not immoral. First, they draw from Catholic thinking to 
provide a philosophical argument for why a fetus is not a human person. Using the argument of 
the prominent Catholic Saint Augustine, if having a human form is the basis for having human 
life, “the question of homicide is not even pertinent with respect to the unformed fetus” 
(Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000, pp. 24, 27). Saint Augustine believed that not only is having a 
human form necessary for being human, but so is sentiency necessary for having personhood. 
Similarly, Catholic priest and philosopher Thomas Aquinas held that “whatever was growing in 
the mother’s womb early in pregnancy was not yet a real human body; hence, it could not be 
animated by a human soul any more than a square block of marble can already possess a human 
shape” (Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000, p. 43). Aquinas also had a similar philosophy to 
Augustine about the animation of the human soul. He believed that first, the fetus is “animated by 
a vegetative or a nutritive soul (anima vegetabilis), then by a sensitive or an animal soul (anima 
sensitiva), finally by a rational or human soul (anima intellectiva)” (Dombrowski & Deltete, 
2000, pp. 45-46). For both of these foundational Catholic thinkers, the fetus in its early stages is 
not a human person because it does not have a human form, nor is it animated by a human soul. 
As such, aborting a fetus in its early stages is not “evil” or “immoral.” 
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Deltete and Dombrowski (2000) also give a scientific reasoning for why a fetus is not a 
human person, and consequently why abortion is not murder, “evil,” or “criminal.” On the basis 
of the common Religious Right claim that a fetus is human when it possesses a human form, this 
does not occur at the “moment of conception.” Rather, it is not until around the third week of 
pregnancy that essential DNA turns a zygote into an embryo. Only at this point during the third 
week of pregnancy is a fetus physically existent in a human shape. However, they are not yet 
capable of being animated or of having sensory emotions. In order for any life to have sensory 
feelings, having a central nervous system is essential, but this does not form for the human fetus 
until the end of the second trimester. As such, at least up until the end of the second trimester, 
Deltete and Dombrowski (2000) claim, aborting a fetus is not immoral, murderous, “evil,” or 
“criminal” because even if the fetus appears human, it is incapable of experiencing love, pain, 
joy, or sadness due to its lack of neurological pathways. 
Finally, Deltete and Dombrowski (2000) provide a philosophical argument for why 
aborting a fetus cannot be considered “evil” by destroying a potential human life. For this, they 
claim, human identity is based on individuals’ connection or “hinge”' to their past, not their 
future (Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000, pp. 66-67). Our identities are shaped by a host of 
experiences ranging from our childhoods, our friendships, our loss, and our pain. Thus, although 
our human form remains somewhat constant (in the sense that we are the same physical body, 
even if that body changes as we grow and develop), our identities are constantly shifting. A 
zygote, an embryo, and a fetus do not have a human form or sensory perceptions, but they also 
have no past with which to form an identity. Another reason why the potential human life claim 
to abortion’s criminality fails is because “actual rights cannot be derived from any potential 
qualifications for them” (Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000, p. 71). It would be strange if I, currently a 
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24 year-old at the writing of this project, began claiming a right to Medicare because I am 
potentially going to be 65 years old one day. I do not currently know that I will live to be 65, 
although I hope I do. Within the present moment, I cannot claim that right because whether or 
not I reach 65 years-old to qualify is not guaranteed. In the same way, a fetus is still forming, 
physically, mentally, emotionally, neurologically, and therefore does not yet have any right to 
life (Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000, p. 77). Abortion is not “evil” on the grounds of destroying 
potential human life because since a fetus has no past, nor does it have any claim to a future, it 
also has no identity or rights. 
Morality may sometimes be subjective or contextual, but the Religious Right’s rhetorical 
use of complicity fails on the “evil” criterion. Until the end of the second trimester, a fetus might 
appear human, but it has no central nervous system for sensory perception. Because a fetus has 
no past, nor does it have a present, it has no identity or claim to future rights. As such, the fetus 
does not suffer and does not constitute a victim, nor do the Religious Right petitioners. Finally, 
due to these moral and scientific reasons, Roe v. Wade (1973) held abortion to be legal and 
therefore not “criminal.” Abortion and contraceptives are thus not only federally legal, but they 
are also legal because they are not absolutely immoral, thereby making the Court’s implicit 
endorsement of the complicity argument on these grounds highly problematic. 
 
On the Agency and Involvement Criteria 
The second and third reasons why Religious Right rhetorical use of complicity is 
incorrect is because it fails to meet the intertwined criterion of agency and involvement. In 
simple terms, agency can be defined as the quality of being able to take action or to choose what 
action to take (Agency, n.). The petitioners in question from these cases may be providing funds, 
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but this does not constitute facilitation because they have little to no degree of agency over the 
individuals with uteruses whose bodies they seek to regulate. As Sepinwall notes, because the 
petitioner does not choose the conduct of the other person seeking an abortion or contraceptives, 
they cannot be responsible for it (Sepinwall, 2015, p. 1916). She notes, “The real question here is 
not whether an employee's decision belongs to, or is attributable to, her employer, but instead 
whether the employer bears some responsibility for the employee's act even if the employers did 
not participate in the decision to pursue that act” (Sepinwall, 2015, p. 1916). The answer to this 
question is a resounding “no.” Employers and taxpayers play no role in an individual’s decision 
to use contraceptives or have an abortion. It would be quite strange for an individual to ask their 
boss or a random stranger on the street for permission to receive reproductive care. Petitioners do 
not even have proxy agency in these situations because they have no authority to act on the 
behalf of the individual seeking an abortion and contraceptive access. Abortion and 
contraceptive use have no implication on the general public because the decision rests primarily, 
and often solely, between the individual and their healthcare provider. 
To reiterate the Lockean framework of complicity, funds for abortions and contraceptives 
may originate in the hands of taxpayers and employers, but once the money leaves their hands, it 
is no longer their property (Locke, 2003, p. 191). By extension, how that funding is used is also 
no longer their property. It would be odd if I received my paycheck from work, bought a car with 
those funds, and then my boss declared that my car was theirs because the money that was used 
to pay for it originated in their property. In the same way, once funding leaves taxpayers’ and 
employers’ hands, what happens with that money is no longer their property because they do not 
have any agency to decide how those funds should be used, if they are to be used at all. Any 
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subsequent act that is performed, or that could potentially be performed, is not their property, 
because that choice rests exclusively between the individual and their healthcare provider. 
This connects to the next complicity criterion that is closely related to agency, which is 
the concept of involvement, yet a third criterion for complicity that Religious Right complicity 
claims fail to meet. The Religious Right’s low degree of agency in abortion and contraceptive 
services also means that they have low involvement. After paying their taxes or providing the 
healthcare option, petitioners end their involvement in any abortion decision. Those funds are no 
longer their “property,” and therefore how they are used is not their responsibility. Likewise, 
they do not go to the healthcare provider with the patient, nor do they put the birth control pills in 
their mouth. Again, it would be odd for an individual to ask their boss or a stranger to go to the 
healthcare facility with them for an abortion or contraceptives. Members of the Religious Right 
are thus not involved in making the decision, nor are they involved in the execution of that 
decision. 
That being said, while in reality the Religious Right does not have agency or involvement 
in others’ abortion and contraceptive use, they have successfully turned to the Supreme Court in 
order to use their state authority and access greater power and exert a larger degree of agency 
over people with uteruses. This is what Sepinwall calls intentional participation by the Religious 
Right and the general public in abortion and contraceptive use (Sepinwall 2015, p. 1913). 
Petitioners do not have to be involved in abortion and contraceptive services, but they have 
chosen to involve themselves, a power that the Supreme Court has unhesitatingly granted them. 
In weighing the U.S. Constitution’s promise of separation of church and state against the 
freedom of religious exercise, the Supreme Court has overwhelmingly favored the latter. In 
doing so, the boundary of public versus private is blurred, making the very private matter of 
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reproductive care public, and, as a result, people with uteruses are deprived of autonomous self- 
government over their bodies. It is clear that Religious Right rhetorical claims to complicity are 
based on a false assumption that reproductive care is a public matter that grants them agency and 
involvement in others’ reproductive care decisions. 
The fact that the Religious Right believe that it is within their authority, their duty even, 
to leverage state power over the reproductive female bodies illustrates what scholar Susan Bordo 
calls the construction of fetuses as “supersubjects” and people with uteruses as mere “fetal 
incubators” (Bordo, 1993, p. 72). Rather than emphasizing the suffering imposed on living, 
breathing, conscious people with uteruses that is caused by the stripping of the reproductive 
agency and autonomy, Religious Right complicity claims emphasize the suffering imposed on a 
non-living, non-breathing, non-conscious fetus. As Bordo writes in her work Unbearable 
Weight, the U.S. legal tradition “divides the human world as Descartes divided all of reality: into 
conscious subjects and mere bodies (rex extensa) (Bordo, 1993, p. 73). By harnessing state legal 
power, the Religious Right elevates the personhood status of the fetus at the expense of the 
pregnant individual’s personhood. The people with uteruses are no longer embodied subjects, but 
are simply disembodied subjects, whose believed obligation is to sacrifice their personhood for 
the fulfillment of another’s (Bordo, 1993, p. 79). Thus, although the Religious Right does not 
have true agency and involvement in others’ reproductive care decisions, they have selectively 
used the legal system to secure state power and make their agency and involvement a perceived 
reality, but they do so on behalf of the false personhood of the fetus at the expense of the pregnant 
person’s. 
 
On the “Reasonable Suspicion” Criterion 
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The final reason why Religious Right complicity claims fail is because their claim to 
“financial facilitation” does not meet the “reasonable suspicion” criterion. In regard to federal 
funding, healthcare, and other social programs to promote access to reproductive care, petitioners 
immediately jump to the conclusion that people are using these funds for abortions and 
contraceptives. In reality, petitioners’ low agency and involvement means little reasonable 
suspicion. Even the term suspicion is inappropriate, because it paints abortion and contraceptive 
use as “evil,” which was disproved in a previous section of this research, and not as essential 
healthcare for citizens’ well-being. This again points to the idea of complicity as a snowball or 
slippery slope effect, but in regard to abortion and contraceptives, it is a fallacy. 
Take the argument presented in Hobby Lobby (2014), for instance. In this case, the 
petitioners start with the premise that the Contraceptive Mandate of the Affordable Care Act 
requires employers to provide a healthcare plan that covers contraceptives without cost-sharing. 
This is a true statement. This initial premise is followed by a second premise, which is that 
abortion falls under contraceptive care. Under the language of the Contraceptive Mandate, this is 
a true statement. However, these two premises are followed by the false conclusion that the 
Contraceptive Mandate means that any healthcare plan that covers contraceptives is going to be 
used only for abortions or “abortifacients,” and only for the purposes of ending pregnancies. A 
similar fallacy forms the basis for policies like the Hyde Amendment, with the initial premises 
being that if federal funds go toward public health programs and facilities, and that program or 
facility includes abortion services (such as Planned Parenthood), then everyone will seek only 
abortion services from those programs or facilities only to end pregnancies. 
Following this slippery slope logic, Religious Right complicity claims fail the 
“reasonable suspicion” criterion on three counts. The first is that because taxpayers and 
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employers have no agency or involvement in others’ reproductive care, they have no way of 
knowing whether citizens or employees are getting abortions or “abortifacients” or not. 
Employers could provide a healthcare plan that covers abortion and contraceptives, but they have 
no way of knowing how many of their employees are using that insurance coverage, if any. As 
such, individuals who claim complicity due to their financial facilitation are disproven because 
there is no “reasonable suspicion” that those funds are even being used. 
The second count on which the “reasonable suspicion” criterion is not met in Religious 
Right complicity claims is that taxpayers and employers have no reasonable suspicion why an 
individual might be using contraceptives or seeking an abortion, if they are. As mentioned in the 
introduction to this paper, there are many uses for contraceptives outside of ending pregnancy, 
including regulating menstruation, preventing ovarian and uterine cancers, treating 
endometriosis, and treating gender dysphoria. An individual might be seeking an abortion 
because pregnancy is a threat to their physical health, or they are not in a financially stable 
position to raise a child once it is born. Because of their low agency and involvement in an 
individual’s reproductive care, a stranger or an employer cannot possibly know why that 
individual is seeking that care. 
The third and final count for “reasonable suspicion” that Religious Right complicity 
claims fail to meet is that even if federal funding or a healthcare plan for reproductive care are 
being used, taxpayers and employers have no way of knowing that they are being used 
specifically for abortion and contraceptives. For instance, in regard to the Hyde Amendment and 
Planned Parenthood, Planned Parenthood does perform abortions and provide birth control, but 
these are not their only services. Planned Parenthood also provides general health care; HIV 
services; gender-affirming treatment like hormone therapy; STD testing, treatment, and 
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vaccinations; fertility testing; pregnancy testing; cancer screenings; sexual dysfunction 
treatment; and sexual education (Our Services). Taxpayers and employers cannot consider 
themselves to be complicit in financially facilitating abortion and contraceptives because that is 
not necessarily what their finances are going toward. 
Because Religious Right complicity claimants have a low degree of agency and 
involvement in others’ reproductive decisions, they also do not have any “reasonable suspicion” if 
their finances are being used, why they are being used, or how they are being used.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
The current COVID-19 pandemic is not our only public health crisis; so, too, is the U.S.’s 
failure to protect access to reproductive care for its 166.7 million people with uteruses (Ranking 
By Population (Female) All Countries in North America.) As this project exposes, the public 
health emergency of reproductive care is no accident: It is the result of a pattern of gendered 
regulation and neglect by our nation’s political institutions through their implicit acceptance of 
Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims. Our society does not view people with uteruses as 
autonomous beings, but rather as disembodied subjects requiring parental-like supervision by 
both the state and the general public. This is especially true when females engage, or at least are 
perceived to engage, in non-monogamous, non-marital, and/or non-procreative sexual behaviors. 
Religious Right anti-choice claims are based on the belief that through taxes and 
healthcare, states and citizens are financially facilitating abortions, and thereby participating in 
the evil, criminal act of killing a fetus. Their financial facilitation is perceived as the first in a 
chain of events that directly leads to destroying a human life, or a potential human life. There are 
no intermediary steps, nor are there alternative endings. The Supreme Court’s acceptance of anti- 
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choice complicity claims institutionalizes the belief that abortion and contraceptives are immoral 
acts, and gives citizens state agency, authority, and power to influence reproductive care 
outcomes on behalf of the false personhood of a fetus. In doing so, people with uteruses are 
reduced to disembodied subjects whose personhood is subordinated for the fulfillment of 
another’s. 
This study lays the foundation for how U.S. legal institutions might create boundaries 
around complicity to better evaluate Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims and balance 
freedoms to religious exercise and reproductive care. This includes the criteria of “evil,” agency, 
involvement, and “reasonable suspicion,” which I have demonstrated Religious Right anti-choice 
complicity claims to fail on all four counts. However, more research is necessary to determine 
exactly what the legal boundaries of complicity should be. This will become increasingly 
apparent as more and more Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims are brought before the 
Supreme Court, particularly in the wake of Hobby Lobby (2014) and Little Sisters of the Poor 
(2020). The state control of female reproduction is full of moral, biological, legal, and political 
conflicts and contradictions that need to continue to be addressed because every body, my own 
included, has a stake. 
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